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 1 Introduction 
 It is natural to think of remembering in terms of causation: I can recall a recent 
dinner with a friend  because I experienced that dinner. Some fi fty years ago, 
 Martin and Deutscher (1966 ) turned this basic thought into a full-fl edged 
theory of memory, a theory that—due both to its intuitive plausibility and 
its apparent success in distinguishing remembering from related processes, 
including imagining—came over the following decades to dominate the 
landscape in the philosophy of memory. Previous approaches, such as the 
empiricist theory, 2 had attempted to capture the nature of remembering from 
a fi rst-person perspective, in terms of its characteristic phenomenology. The 
causal theory, in contrast, offered a third-personal account of the nature of 
remembering. Remembering, Martin and Deutscher argue, boils down to the 
existence of a specifi c sort of causal connection between the rememberer’s 
original experience of an event and his later representation of that event: a 
causal connection sustained by a memory trace. 
 Though it initially seemed to boost the theory’s fi t with the empirical 
science of memory, it has become apparent in recent years that this 
reference to memory traces in fact threatens to undermine the causal 
theory. As older conceptions of memory in terms of storage and retrieval 
have given way to new conceptions of remembering as a constructive 
or simulational process, contemporary memory science has appeared to 
overturn not only the particular view of traces advocated by Martin and 
Deutscher but also the more general claim that traces—of one sort or 
another—are essential to remembering. Contemporary proponents of the 
causal theory have thus been confronted with the question: is it possible 
to develop an empirically adequate version of the theory, or is it time to 
move beyond the causal theory? The purpose of this chapter is to trace the 
recent history of the causal theory, showing how increased awareness of 
problems for the classical causal theory has led to the development of a 
variety of updated versions of the theory and ultimately to the emergence 
of postcausal theories. 
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 2 The Classical Causal Theory 
 Like most subsequent causal theorists, Martin and Deutscher focus on 
episodic memory, memory for past events. Omitting certain technical details, 
they argue that a subject remembers a past event if and only if (1) he now 
represents the event, (2) he experienced the event when it took place, and 
(3) there is a causal connection between his current representation of the 
event and his experience of it. This account treats memory as a diachronic 
capacity, in the sense that it claims that for remembering to occur is for 
there to be a particular relationship between representations located at two 
different points in time: the subject’s original experiential representation of 
the event and his current retrieved representation 3 of the event. Conditions 
(1) and (2) require the existence of these representations and are widely 
accepted constraints on remembering. It is in virtue of the third condition, 
stipulating a causal connection between the two representations, that Martin 
and Deutscher’s account qualifi es as a  causal theory. Anticausal approaches 
to the mind in general (e.g.,  Wittgenstein, 1953 ;  Holland, 1954 ) and to 
memory in particular (e.g.,  Malcolm, 1963 ;  Squires, 1969 ) were popular 
when Martin and Deutscher wrote, and the causal condition was therefore 
objectionable to many of their contemporaries. Nevertheless, though 
acausal accounts of memory are still occasionally defended (e.g.,  Martin, 
2001 ;  Hamilton, 2003 ), the causal theory, arguably due to the attention 
devoted by Martin and Deutscher to refi ning condition (3), gradually won 
out over the alternatives. 
 In formulating the causal condition, Martin and Deutscher’s primary 
concern was to differentiate  remembering from  imagining . Even if a subject 
somehow manages to produce a representation that is accurate with respect 
to a past experience that she has had, her representation will intuitively fail 
to qualify as a memory if it lacks a causal connection to that experience. 
Suppose that Roger attends a magic show. Later, he suffers an accident, the 
result of which is complete retrograde amnesia: he no longer remembers 
events from his past, including the magic show. Also as a result of the 
accident, he is prone to producing confabulatory accounts of past events. 
Suppose that he produces a story that happens to correspond in perfect detail 
to his experience of the magic show. Conditions (1) and (2) are satisfi ed, but 
Roger is clearly not remembering. This sort of coincidental correspondence 
between an experiential representation and a retrieved representation may 
be unlikely, but its very possibility suggests the need for a causal connection 
between the representations—absent such a connection, the subject would 
seem to be merely imagining. Hence condition (3). 
 Martin and Deutscher argue further that not just any causal connection 
between an experiential representation and a retrieved representation suffi ces 
for remembering: remembering requires a causal connection sustained by a 
 memory trace . The inclusion of a reference to memory traces in the theory 
is necessary in part in order to differentiate remembering from  relearning , 
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which occurs when one acquires information through experience, forgets 
it, and then reacquires it from another source. Suppose, again, that Roger 
attends a magic show; later, he suffers an accident, the result of which is 
complete retrograde amnesia. If, at some point between the show and the 
accident, Roger told his friend Lane about the show, then he might later 
relearn of it from him. Suppose that Lane comforts Roger after his trauma 
by repeating stories of his past, including that of the magic show. As a result, 
Roger is again able to represent the event. In this case, the experiential 
representation and the retrieved representation are causally connected: 
Roger’s experience of the magic show is the cause of his conversation with 
Lane, which is in turn causally implicated in Lane’s relaying the information 
to him. But intuitively this is a case of relearning, not remembering. 
 In differentiating remembering from relearning, Martin and Deutscher 
were sensitive to the fact that the occurrence of remembering is compatible 
with the use of external prompts. Drawing a distinction between remembering 
and relearning requires saying when external information serves as a mere 
supplement to memory and when it serves as a replacement for it; that is, we 
need a way of excluding  relearning while permitting  prompting . Martin and 
Deutscher do not draw the distinction in terms of the quantity of external 
information involved in the process of (apparent) remembering but rather 
in terms of the role it plays. Remembering, for them, is compatible with 
extensive prompting from external sources. What matters is whether there 
is also an internal state of the (apparent) rememberer that is active—a state 
acquired as a result of the experience that he is trying to remember, that is, 
a memory trace. Condition (3) thus becomes: there is a causal connection, 
sustained by a memory trace, between the subject’s retrieved representation 
of the event and his experiential representation of the event. 
 Just as the bare requirement of a causal connection was objectionable to 
many of Martin and Deutscher’s contemporaries, so was the more specifi c 
requirement of a causal connection sustained by a memory trace. Some 
worried that to include a reference to memory traces in a philosophical 
theory of remembering was to allow philosophy to “dictate to science 
what to discover in the human brain” ( Zemach, 1983 : 32). Others were 
concerned about infl uence in the opposite direction, worrying that Martin 
and Deutscher’s reference to memory traces was an attempt to import a 
scientifi c notion into the everyday concept of memory that philosophy was 
meant to analyze ( Malcolm, 1977 ). The relationship of the causal theory of 
memory to the science of memory remains an open question, and we return 
to this question in subsequent sections. 
 Martin and Deutscher were also sensitive to the possibility that a 
cognitive capacity other than memory, also acquired during the subject’s 
experience of an event, might result in a later representation of the event. 
The desire to preclude this possibility led them to add further details to the 
memory trace requirement. Suppose that Roger, while attending the magic 
show, is hypnotized and as a result can be placed in a highly suggestible 
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state. Suppose that Lane tells Roger about the magic show while he is in 
this suggestible state and that Roger endorses Lane’s account. Intuitively, 
though there is a causal connection between his experience of the magic 
show and his representation of it, he does not remember the magic show. 
This case fails to be a case of remembering because, while Roger might 
have a suitable memory trace, his memory trace is not doing the relevant 
causal work—it is some other,  nonmemorial capacity that is responsible 
for the representation. To exclude such cases of nonmemorial retention, 4
Martin and Deutscher argue that remembering requires the preservation 
of a trace that  represents the past and provides the content of the retrieved 
representation. In particular, they see traces as “structural analogues” of 
past experiences: a memory trace is an entity that contains a quantity of 
information that matches or exceeds what the subject recalls about the 
relevant event. In other words, remembering, for them, necessarily involves 
the transmission of content from experience to retrieval and is incompatible 
with the generation of new content between experience and retrieval. 
 Martin and Deutscher’s appeal to memory traces is simultaneously a 
nod to convention and a bold innovation. On the one hand, the claim that 
memory traces are structural analogues of past experience is a longstanding 
and widespread assumption of both philosophical and everyday thinking 
about memory (see  Draaisma, 2000 ;  De Brigard, 2014b ): just as Martin and 
Deutscher compare memory to the grooves of a record, Plato, for example, 
compared it to impressions in a wax tablet. On the other hand, Martin and 
Deutscher offer a new reason for this old view of memory traces, treating 
traces not as the  objects of remembering but rather as the  bearers of the 
right sort of causal connection between the experiential representation and 
the retrieved representation. Despite the fact that the characterization of 
memory traces as structural analogues of past experiences is traditional, 
however, there is reason to prune it from the causal theory. To say that 
memory traces are structural analogues of past experiences is to say that 
a memory trace represents an experience in virtue of its standing in a 
relationship of structural isomorphism with that event. As an account of 
mental representation, structural isomorphism provides a way of ensuring 
that the inferential interactions between the contents of thought are refl ected 
in the causal interactions between the vehicles by which they are represented. 
Although this view of mental representations was popular at the time at which 
Martin and Deutscher were writing, it is controversial and is not now widely 
endorsed (e.g.,  Shepard & Chipman, 1970 ). Moreover, the characterization 
of memory traces as structural analogues of past experience makes a claim 
about how mental representation works, and this specifi c claim goes beyond 
the general claim, required by the causal theory, that memory traces must be 
mental representations. 5 In what follows, we therefore do not interpret the 
classical causal theory as incorporating a characterization of memory traces 
as structural analogues of past experiences. 
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 According to the classical causal theory, then, it is memory traces that make 
the difference between a mere causal connection between an experiential 
representation and a retrieved representation and what we can refer to as 
an  appropriate causal connection, a causal connection of the sort required 
to underwrite remembering. Pruned of the structural analogy requirement, 
the causal theory makes an empirical bet regarding the existence of traces 
but stops short of betting on any particular account of the physical nature of 
memory traces. The physical details do not matter; only certain very general 
features do. In line with their treatment of imagining, relearning, and 
nonmemorial retention, Martin and Deutscher are committed to viewing 
memory traces, fi rst, as being distinct  states and second, as having distinct 
 contents . 
 Regarding the fi rst commitment, a memory trace must be a distinct, 
internal state of the rememberer. In order for this condition to be met, the 
causal chain leading back to the experience must be distinguishable from 
other causal chains. After all, people have multiple memories and therefore 
multiple memory traces. Roger, from our previous example, has a memory 
of attending a magic show but presumably many other memories as well. To 
determine whether he remembers the magic show requires establishing that 
that this particular causal chain has been sustained. To determine whether 
he remembers another experience—his fi fth birthday, for instance—requires 
establishing the existence of a different causal chain. This is only possible 
if the chain supported by each internal state is distinct. This distinctness 
serves as a marker of the unique causal history of each memory trace, 
which becomes especially important in establishing the difference between 
remembering and relearning. Remembering and relearning might produce 
exactly similar representations; the only way of differentiating between 
them is by when and how they were acquired. 
 Regarding the second commitment, the memory trace must not only pro-
vide a distinct causal link via an internal state that serves as a representation 
of that experience. As in the earlier example of hypnosis, it is possible that 
other aspects of a preserved internal state could result in a representation of 
a past experience. If we are to establish the difference between remember-
ing and nonmemorial forms of retention, then there must be some way in 
which the memory trace is distinct from these other processes. The memory 
trace must be a distinct component of the internal state in which it features, 
distinguishable from all other components this state may have. The memory 
trace is distinctive, Martin and Deutscher argue, because it alone represents 
that past experience. By preserving information about that event or experi-
ence across time, the memory trace is distinguishable from other retained 
states that could in one or another way result in representations of the ex-
perience. Moreover, by preserving information over time, the memory trace 
provides an explanation of how accurate retention of information from the 
past is possible. 
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 3 Neoclassical Causal Theories 
 Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher wrote, the classical causal theory 
continues to be infl uential, and a number of causal theories that may be 
characterized as  neoclassical have recently been developed. Neoclassical 
causal theories retain the core claim of Martin and Deutscher’s theory—
that an appropriate causal connection (where appropriate causation is 
understood as causation going via a memory trace) is both necessary 
and, along with other suitable conditions, suffi cient for memory—while 
modifying certain less central elements of the theory. The theories proposed 
by  Bernecker (2008 ,  2010 ) and  Cheng and Werning (2016 ) are illustrative 
of the neoclassical approach. 
 Offering a systematic argument for the superiority of the causal theory 
over noncausal theories, Bernecker offers a detailed development of a causal 
theory in the spirit of Martin and Deutscher’s. In particular, he understands 
appropriate causation in terms of contiguity, maintaining that it is the pres-
ence of an uninterrupted chain of memory traces between learning and re-
membering that distinguishes remembering from imagining and relearning. 
Bernecker’s analysis also updates Martin and Deutscher’s in certain respects. 
First, he denies that the content of the experiential representation and the 
content of the retrieved representation must be identical. Instead, they must 
be “suffi ciently similar” ( 2010 : 217): content can change over time (e.g., one 
might initially remember receiving a new bicycle and later only remember 
receiving a gift), but no new content can be generated. Second, he endorses 
a distributed view of traces. Unlike the distributed conceptions of traces that 
we discuss in the next section, however, Bernecker’s view is that traces are 
distributed at the implementational level only, allowing content transmis-
sion to occur at the psychological level. 
 Cheng and Werning’s approach differs from Bernecker’s in terms of both 
scope and method. In terms of scope, Bernecker discusses a range of forms of 
memory, including memory for persons and things, memory for properties, 
memory for events, and memory for facts and propositions, focusing on the 
latter. Cheng and Werning focus specifi cally on memory for events—more 
precisely, on episodic memory, their understanding of which, in line with 
the psychological literature on mental time travel ( Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997 ), includes a role for autonoesis, or consciousness of the self in subjec-
tive time ( Tulving, 1985 ), a topic to which we return in Section 3. In terms 
of method, whereas Bernecker relies primarily on the tools of conceptual 
analysis. Cheng and Werning’s approach is naturalistic in spirit, appealing 
to data on the role of specifi c brain structures, primarily the hippocampus, 
in remembering; like  Michaelian (2011b ), they seek to understand memory 
as a natural kind. While this naturalistic approach lends a degree of meth-
odological novelty to their approach, the main substantive novelty of their 
version of the causal theory consists in its characterization of memory repre-
sentations as being sequential in nature, a characterization they derive from 
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their understanding of the role of hippocampal processes in remembering 
( cf. Cheng, Werning, & Suddendorf, 2016 ). Ultimately, however, the gist of 
their theory—which requires that the retrieved representation be causally 
grounded in the corresponding earlier experience via a memory trace—is 
similar to that of Bernecker’s, which, as we have seen, is in turn similar to 
that of Martin and Deutscher’s. 
 Both  Bernecker (2008 ,  2010 ) and  Cheng and Werning (2016 ) can thus 
be classifi ed as neoclassical causal theorists, 6 and the differences between 
their respective versions of the causal theory, as well as those between their 
versions of the causal theory and Martin and Deutscher’s version of the 
theory, can be set aside for present purposes. Both classical and neoclassical 
causal theorists assume, fi rst, that remembering involves the  transmission
of content from experience to retrieval and second, that remembering is 
incompatible with the  generation of new content between experience and 
retrieval. Each of these assumptions has, however, been denied by other 
recent versions of the causal theory. We consider theories that deny the 
former assumption in Section 5 and theories that deny the latter in Section 6. 
 4 Hybrid Theories 
 Setting the issues of transmission and generation aside for the moment, we 
emphasize that Martin and Deutscher’s core claim—that an appropriate 
causal connection is both necessary and, along with other suitable 
conditions, suffi cient for memory—is accepted in one form or another 
by many contemporary philosophers of memory (see  Debus, 2017 ). 7 In 
particular, we note that the literature contains few challenges to the claim 
that appropriate causal connection is  necessary for memory. Some invoke 
this claim in passing while focusing on other issues (e.g.,  Debus, 2008 ,  2014 ; 
 Hopkins, 2014 ). Others do not invoke it but nevertheless say nothing to 
challenge it. In contrast, the literature does contain a number of challenges 
to the claim that appropriate causation is  suffi cient for memory. If one of 
these challenges were to succeed, it would be necessary to supplement the 
appropriate causation condition—along with the other basic conditions 
required by the causal theory—with a further condition, thus producing a 
 hybrid theory of remembering. 
 Debus (2010 ; cf.  James, forthcoming ), for example, argues that genuine 
memories are, in addition to being causally connected to the subject’s past 
experiences, necessarily  epistemically relevant to the subject, in the sense 
that he is disposed to take them into account when forming judgments about 
the past, typically (but not always) by forming a belief that the remembered 
event occurred. Because the classical causal theory does not treat epistemic 
relevance as necessary for remembering, Debus maintains, it is bound to 
classify certain cases as instances of genuine memory when in fact they are 
instances of merely apparent memory. (Consider Martin and Deutscher’s 
oft-discussed case of a painter who paints a scene from his past without 
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realizing that it is a scene from his past.) This argument, which, if it works, 
applies equally to neoclassical causal theories, in effect suggests that the 
causal theory should be replaced with a hybrid  causal-epistemic theory. 
 Similarly,  Klein (2014 ,  2015 ; cf.  Dokic, 2014 ) argues that genuine 
memories necessarily involve, in addition to causal connection, a specifi c 
phenomenology:  autonoetic consciousness , or a sense of the self in subjective 
time.  Klein and Nichols (2012 ; cf.  Fernández, forthcoming ), for example, 
discuss the case of patient RB, whom they characterize as having retained 
the capacity to retrieve information deriving from his past experiences but 
as lacking a “sense of mineness” for the memories thus produced. Though 
the causal theory would classify the case of RB as one in which the subject is 
capable of remembering, on Klein’s view RB is, because he lacks the capacity 
for autonoesis, incapable of genuine memory. This argument, which, if it 
works, applies, like Debus’s argument, equally to the other versions of the 
causal theory considered so far, in effect suggests that the causal theory 
should be replaced with a hybrid  causal-autonoetic theory. 
 The causal-autonoetic theory and the causal-epistemic theory are 
close cousins: as Mahr and Csibra (forthcoming) have emphasized, the 
involvement of autonoesis in remembering explains the subject’s tendency 
to believe that remembered events occurred. And they are thus vulnerable 
to similar challenges. In particular, both the causal-autonoetic and the 
causal-epistemic theory imply that semantic memory (memory for facts) 
differs radically in kind from episodic memory (memory for experienced 
events) ( Michaelian, 2015 ), suggesting that they confl ate a requirement for 
episodicity ( Perrin & Rousset, 2014 ) with a requirement for  mnemicity
( Michaelian & Sutton, 2017 ). Even if autonoesis or epistemic relevance 
turns out to be a requirement for mnemicity, however, there would appear 
to be nothing that would prevent an advocate of a given version of the 
causal theory (or a given postcausal theory; see Section 6) from adding an 
appropriate condition to his theory. Hybrid theories will therefore be set 
aside in what follows. 
 5 Distributed and Procedural Causal Theories 
 Though it accepts the suffi ciency of appropriate causation, there is a sense in 
which the distributed causal theory departs more radically from the classical 
causal theory than do hybrid theories. Hybrid theorists posit conditions on 
remembering in addition to the appropriate causation condition. Distributed 
causal theorists take a different tack, modifying the concept of a memory 
trace in such a way that the appropriate causation condition can arguably no 
longer be understood as requiring transmission of content from experience 
to retrieval. We say “arguably,” for distributed causal theorists have not 
always been clear about whether they deny that appropriate causation 
involves transmission of content. Indeed, the literature contains no detailed 
articulation of the distributed causal theory.  Sutton (1998 ,  2010 ) has 
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provided a detailed account of  the distributed conception of traces but has 
said little about how this conception of traces might be combined with  the 
causal theory .  Bernecker (2010 ) and  Michaelian (2011 ), meanwhile, have 
developed detailed versions of the causal theory that endorse distributed 
traces in principle but have said little about their own distributed conceptions 
of traces. 
 Notwithstanding this gap in the literature, it is uncontroversial that the 
inspiration for the distributed causal theory comes primarily from debates 
and developments regarding the nature of mental representation more 
generally. Much as a general view of mental representation in terms of 
structural analogy infl uenced Martin and Deutscher’s account of traces as 
structural analogues of experience, proponents of distributed conceptions 
of traces have been infl uenced by connectionist, dynamicist, and distributed 
views of mental representation. The traditional conception of traces involves 
fi xed, explicit contents carried by distinct local vehicles. The vehicles in 
question might be distributed in the sense that they are complex entities 
the parts of which are stored in different locations, but they are local in the 
sense that each memory content is carried by a distinct vehicle. Proponents 
of distributed conceptions challenge this matrix of ideas, arguing that we 
should give up at least some of the features of the traditional conception. 
 Sutton’s account of distributed traces comes closest to a full-blown 
rejection of the traditional conception: memories, he argues, “are blended, 
not laid down independently once and for all, and are reconstructed rather 
than reproduced” ( 1998 : 2). On this account, a subject’s memory is a 
network in which various items of information are connected as a function 
of the frequency with which they cooccur in his experience. Each experience 
activates a certain pattern in the network, but the patterns overlap in a way 
that precludes distinct contents or vehicles. If this view is right, we may be 
able to refer to memory traces in a loose sense, since a specifi c experience 
will result in a specifi c modifi cation of connections in the network, but these 
are traces of a sort that require us to reject the two key commitments of 
(neo)classical causal theories (identifi ed in Section 2): there are no traces 
in the sense of  distinct vehicles carrying  distinct contents . Due to the gap 
in the literature noted earlier, it remains unclear how, in view of the fact 
that they reject these commitments, distributed causal theorists would have 
us understand the nature of the causal connection that they take to hold 
between retrieved memories and experiences, and there is a pressing need 
for further work on this question. 
 Some distributed causal theorists have been less specifi c about the nature of 
memory traces but have tried to reconcile a distributed conception of traces 
with the appropriate causation condition. These authors reject the (neo)
classical assumption that remembering involves the transmission of content 
from experience to retrieval, instead maintaining that content is reconstructed 
at the time of retrieval. To say that remembering is  reconstructive , rather 
than  reproductive , is to say that the content of a retrieved representation is, 
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at least in part, produced at the time of retrieval, rather than transmitted 
from the corresponding experience. There is a long-standing consensus in 
the empirical literature that remembering is reconstructive in this sense (see, 
e.g.,  Schacter & Addis, 2007 ;  Schacter et al., 2012 ). One possible reaction 
to the reconstructive character of remembering would be to continue to 
understand traces as distinct entities but to hold that their content is implicit 
in the sense that it needs to be activated or made explicit at the time of 
retrieval (see  Vosgerau, 2010 ). Another possible reaction is provided by the 
procedural causal theory developed by Perrin (this volume). 
 The procedural causal theory explicitly denies that remembering 
involves the transmission of content. Perrin retains a generic version of 
the core claim of the causal theory—that an appropriate causal connection 
is both necessary and along with other suitable conditions, suffi cient 
for memory—but understands it in a radically different manner than do 
(neo)classical causal theorists. Whereas (neo)classical causal theorists 
understand causal connection in terms of the transmission of content 
via memory traces, procedural causal theorists take the reconstructive 
character of remembering to undermine this understanding of causation in 
memory. Inspired by older attributionalist approaches in psychology (e.g., 
 Kolers & Roediger, 1984 ;  Jacoby &Whitehouse, 1989 ;  Whittlesea, 1997 ), 
Perrin proposes an alternative understanding of the nature of causation 
in memory. The key idea is that, rather than the  content of the retrieved 
representation being causally related to the  content of the corresponding 
experience, it is the  process that produces the retrieved representation 
that is causally related to the  process that produced the corresponding 
experience. Adopting a view of perception as itself being a constructive 
process, Perrin’s suggestion is that the constructive process of perceiving 
may bear certain similarities to the reconstructive process of remembering 
and thus give rise to a degree of fl uency in the latter—it is in general easier 
to reconstruct a scene that one has previously constructed—despite the fact 
that no content is transmitted. 
 The procedural causal theory may succeed in providing a description of a 
kind of  causal connection that can obtain between experience and retrieval 
despite the fact that no content is transmitted from the former to the latter. 
But it does not yet provide a description of what it is for such a causal 
connection to be  appropriate . While this is a potential problem, perhaps a 
more pressing question for both procedural and distributed causal theorists is 
whether they mean to retain the (neo)classical assumption that remembering 
is incompatible with the generation of new content between experience and 
retrieval. In one sense, of course, distributed and procedural causal theories 
necessarily acknowledge that remembering involves the generation of 
content, since they claim that content from previous experience is retained 
at best only implicitly, which implies that content must be “regenerated” 
at the time of retrieval. But this is just to say that they deny what might be 
called “ transmissionism, ” the view that (explicit) content is stored between 
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experience and retrieval. In another sense—and this is the sense that matters 
here—they may deny that remembering involves the generation of content, 
since it is open to them to deny that “regenerated” retrieved content may 
include information going beyond that of the experience. That is, it is open 
to them to accept  preservationism , the view that a retrieved representation 
may not include content not included in the original experience. 
 More conservative versions of the theories will accept preservationism, 
but the basic distributed and procedural causal theories can be conjoined 
with a range of views on the generation of content. The more extreme the 
views become, the more likely they are to reject the core commitments of 
the causal theory. The most conservative view available is that the content 
of the retrieved representation is identical to the content of the experiential 
representation. This extreme form of preservationism is incompatible 
even with the occurrence of forgetting and is not to be taken seriously. An 
intermediate view is that the content of the retrieved representation must 
be contained in or in some sense implied by the content of the experiential 
representation. This more moderate form of preservationism is compatible 
with the occurrence of forgetting but not with the generation of new content 
between experience and retrieval and is explicitly endorsed by some (e.g., 
 Bernecker, 2008 ,  2010 ;  Cheng & Werning, 2016 ) and implicitly assumed 
by many others. While it is always possible in principle to hold on to 
preservationism by enriching the content of experience ( McCarroll, 2017 ), 
we will see later that there is a real tension between even the moderate form 
of preservationism and the reconstructive character of remembering, which 
suggests a form of  generationism according to which the content of the 
retrieved representation may indeed include information not included in the 
content of the experiential representation. 8 
 6 Postcausal Theories 
 As we saw in Section 4, the suffi ciency of appropriate causation is challenged 
by hybrid theories on phenomenological or epistemic grounds. A different 
sort of challenge to the suffi ciency of appropriate causation arises due to 
the reconstructive character of remembering, i.e., due to the fact that the 
content of retrieved representations is, at least in part, produced at the 
time of retrieval, rather than derived from the content of the corresponding 
experience. Reconstruction, in fact, challenges not only the suffi ciency of 
appropriate causation but also its necessity and has therefore led to the 
emergence of theories that may be characterized as  postcausal , in the sense 
that they claim that a causal connection—“appropriate” or otherwise—is 
not necessary for memory, even while recognizably descending from the 
causal theory. Postcausal theories in effect treat memory as a synchronic 
rather than a diachronic capacity, in the sense that they see the occurrence of 
remembering as depending on what happens when the subject (apparently) 
remembers, rather than on whether there is a suitable relationship between 
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the subject’s retrieved representation and his experiential representation; 
thus, unlike hybrid theories, they move decisively beyond the causal theory. 
 One intriguing postcausal theory is the functionalist theory, which 
Fernández (this volume) offers as an alternative to both the causal theory 
and the narrative theory of memory (e.g.,  Schechtman, 1994 ;  Goldie, 2012 ; 
 Brockmeier, 2015 ). Fernández argues that the causal theory is both too 
strict, in that it is incompatible with the generation of new content during 
reconstructive remembering, and too weak, in that it ignores the tendency 
(emphasized by hybrid theories) for memory to give rise to belief. He likewise 
argues that the narrative theory—which, emphasizing reconstruction, views 
remembering as an imaginative process in which the subject draws on stored 
information deriving from his experiences, along with information deriving 
from other sources, to create narratives about his past—is both too strict, 
in that it does not acknowledge the possibility of memories that are not 
embedded in narratives, and too weak, in that it does not acknowledge any 
role at all for the causal history of memories. The alternative that Fernández 
offers is a theory on which a mental state qualifi es as a memory just in case 
it plays the  functional role that memories typically play, where this role is a 
matter, fi rst, of tending to cause belief and second, of tending to be caused 
by past experience. What is most important about the functionalist theory, 
in the present context, is the second of these claims: while the functionalist 
theory requires, in order for a mental state to qualify as a memory, that 
it  tend to be caused by the subject’s past experience of the remembered 
event, it does not require that the mental state  actually be caused by the 
experience. The functionalist theory thus rejects the core claim of the causal 
theory. 
 In line with our previous discussion of the causal-epistemic theory, the 
second of the functionalist’s claims, regarding the link between memory and 
belief, may be understood as concerning episodicity, rather than mnemicity. 
If we therefore disregard this claim, Fernández’ functionalist theory and the 
simulation theories recently developed by a number of authors ( Shanton & 
Goldman, 2010 ; De Brigard, 2014a;  Michaelian, 2016 ) come to broadly 
similar conclusions about the nature of remembering. The path taken by 
the simulation theorist is, however, somewhat less direct, involving a close 
consideration of the role of traces in remembering. It might be thought, given 
the association between reconstruction and distributed/procedural theories, 
that local trace theories can avoid the challenge posed by reconstruction, 
but the causal theory cannot in fact be protected by retreating to the local 
conception. Even if, as noted previously, the distributed conception has in 
many cases been adopted only in a nominal sense, most philosophers of 
memory have been in principle convinced by the arguments in favor of the 
distributed conception. And even if some have not yet been convinced by the 
arguments and so deliberately continue to work with the local conception, 
they are nevertheless bound, given the weight of the evidence in its favor, 
to acknowledge the reconstructive character of remembering within the 
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parameters of the local conception. The challenge must thus be faced by all 
causal theorists. 
 Is the existence of an appropriate causal connection between the 
retrieved representation and the experiential representation suffi cient for 
remembering, given the local conception of traces? Given reconstruction, 
the local trace theorist must acknowledge what we might refer to as “the 
fact of multiple experiences”: multiple experiences may contribute to the 
content of a single stored trace. He must also acknowledge what we might 
refer to as “the fact of multiple traces”: multiple traces may contribute to the 
content of a single retrieved representation. These facts together imply that, 
if a given retrieved representation is appropriately causally connected to a 
given experience, it may also be appropriately causally connected to other 
experiences. The existence of an appropriate causal connection thus does 
not suffi ce, given the local conception, to determine whether the subject is 
remembering a given event. 
 Is the existence of an appropriate causal connection between the retrieved 
representation and the experiential representation suffi cient for remembering, 
given the distributed conception of traces? Given the distributed conception, 
retrieval is a matter of activating certain ideas—nodes in a larger network 
of ideas—together. The tendency for certain ideas to be activated together 
is, however, not attributable to a unique event, since the relevant connection 
weights have inevitably been affected by multiple experiences ( Robins, 
2016b ). Nor is there any guarantee that a given retrieved representation 
matches a unique experiential representation. It is, as noted in Section 5, not 
entirely clear how the notion of appropriate causation is to be understood 
by the distributed trace theorist. But however it is understood, it would 
appear that the distributed conception implies that, if a given retrieved 
representation is appropriately causally connected to a given experience, 
it may also be appropriately causally connected to other experiences. The 
existence of an appropriate causal connection thus does not suffi ce, given 
the distributed conception, to determine whether the subject is remembering 
a given event. 
 If appropriate causation were merely to fail to be suffi cient for memory, it 
would be possible to save the causal theory by means of the incorporation 
of an additional condition, in the manner of the hybrid theories discussed in 
Section 3. But reconstruction appears to undermine not only the suffi ciency 
of appropriate causation but also its necessity. Beginning with the local 
conception of traces, the fact of multiple experiences and the fact of multiple 
traces together imply that the content of a retrieved representation will 
typically not derive entirely from that of the relevant earlier experience. 
In some cases, a majority of the content may so derive. In other cases, 
however, only a minority of the content so derives. And in some cases, 
none of the content so derives. As long as some of the content derives from 
the experience, of course, a causal connection obtains, and it is intuitively 
plausible that there is a difference in kind between such cases and cases in 
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which none of the content derives from the experience. On the basis of this 
intuition, Michaelian (2011a) has argued for a constructive causal theory, 
a theory that is like the causal theory in that it requires the  transmission of 
content from experience to retrieval (accepting transmissionism) but unlike 
it in that it permits the  generation of new content between experience and 
retrieval (rejecting preservationism and accepting generationism). 
 Robins (2016a ), who likewise seeks to retain the causal theory while 
acknowledging the reconstructive character of remembering, has defended 
a broadly similar approach. While constructive causal approaches provide 
an appealing means of reconciling the causal theory with reconstruction, 
however, the empirical research on reconstruction suggests, as Michaelian 
has pointed out in subsequent work ( 2016c ) that the very same cognitive 
process may be at work both in cases in which  some content is transmitted 
from the experience and in cases in which  no content is transmitted. This 
in turn implies that, given the local conception of traces, causal connection 
does not mark the difference between genuine and merely apparent memory. 
Turning to the distributed conception of traces, we fi nd a similar implication. 
Due to the blended nature of distributed storage, not all of the ideas that 
compose a given retrieved memory are activated because of the relevant 
earlier experience. In some cases, a majority of the ideas may be activated 
due to the earlier experience. In some cases, however, only a minority are. 
And in some cases, none are. There is, however, no reason to suppose that 
there is a difference in kind between cases in which none of the ideas are 
activated because of the relevant earlier experience and cases in which at 
least some are—in cases of both sorts, the same process may be at work. This 
implies that, given the distributed conception of traces, causal connection 
does not mark the difference between genuine and merely apparent memory. 
 A distributed or procedural causal theorist might object that this 
argument presupposes transmissionism, which distributed and procedural 
theories reject. The idea would be that a distributed/procedural theory can 
reject transmission but accept either preservationism or a moderate form 
of generationism according to which there must be some degree of overlap 
between the content of the retrieved representation and the content of 
the earlier representation in order for genuine remembering to occur. The 
distributed/procedural theorist can then maintain that genuine remembering 
occurs only if, fi rst, there is such overlap, and second, this overlap is 
due to the presence of an appropriate causal connection, understood in 
nontransmissionist terms. While this is an interesting objection, it assumes 
that a convincing nontransmissionist account of appropriate causation can 
be formulated, and this remains to be done. The argument given previously 
does not presuppose transmissionism but does bet that there will turn out to 
be no interesting difference between cases in which the activation of at least 
some of the relevant ideas is due to the earlier experience and cases in which 
the activation of none of them is due to the earlier experience. 
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 Reacting to these diffi culties for the constructive causal theory, Michaelian 
has proposed a  simulation theory of remembering, the key idea of which is 
that, contrary to the basic assumption of the causal theorist, there is no 
difference between remembering the past and imagining it, in which case 
memory does not presuppose a causal connection—to remember just is to 
imagine the past.  De Brigard (2014a ), though he is less explicit about his 
stance on the necessity of causal connection, has developed a similar view, 
treating episodic memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought, or 
thought about possible events. And  Shanton and Goldman (2010 ) have 
likewise argued that remembering is to be understood in simulational 
terms, linking remembering to theory of mind. Evidence for the simulation 
theory comes from research on episodic memory as a form of mental time 
travel analogous to episodic future thought ( Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997 ). A large body of research now supports the view that the process of 
remembering the past is executed by the same cognitive system as the process 
of imagining the future and indeed, that imagining the future is the primary 
function of the system in question (see  Michaelian, Klein, & Szpunar, 2016 ). 
Both imagining the future and remembering the past draw on stored content 
originating in experience of past events. Imagining a future event does not, 
of course, draw on content originating in experience of the particular event 
imagined. By the same token, the mental time travel framework suggests that 
remembering a past event does not necessarily draw on content originating in 
experience of the particular event remembered. From a broadly naturalistic 
point of view, this, in turn, suggests that remembering does not presuppose 
a causal connection. 
 If remembering does not presuppose a causal connection, a fortiori it 
does not presuppose an  appropriate causal connection. But this does not 
mean that the process of imagining the past cannot itself be appropriate 
or inappropriate: if the subject imagines the past in the wrong way, the 
representation he produces may fail to qualify as a memory, even if it should 
happen to be accurate. Not only simulation theorists but also constructive 
causal theorists, who acknowledge that memories may be in part the product 
of imagination, even if they deny that they can be wholly the product of 
imagination, thus must provide an account of the appropriateness of the 
process of imagining the past. Michaelian’s version of the constructive 
causal theory therefore incorporates a reliability condition—a condition 
requiring that the system function in such a way that it tends to produce 
mostly accurate representations—and this condition is inherited by his 
version of the simulation theory, which, strictly speaking, says that to 
remember a past event is to imagine it  in a reliable manner . The reliability 
condition enables the simulation theory to distinguish remembering, 
understood as imagining the past, from confabulation and other ways of 
merely imagining the past. It remains to be seen whether further conditions 
must be added to the simulation theory to enable it to distinguish between 
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Figure 1.1  Relationships among causal and postcausal theories. (Neo)classical 
causal theories (Martin & Deutscher, 1966; Bernecker, 2008, 2010; 
Cheng & Werning, 2016) maintain that appropriate causation is 
both necessary and sufficient for remembering and endorse both 
transmissionism and generationism. Distributed and procedural causal 
theories (Sutton, 1998; Perrin, this volume) agree with (neo)classical 
causal theories that appropriate causation is both necessary and sufficient 
for remembering, but their distributed conception of traces leads them 
to reject transmissionism. Constructive causal theories (Michaelian, 
2011; Robins, 2016b) likewise agree that appropriate causation is both 
necessary and sufficient for remembering, but their constructive view 
of remembering leads them to reject preservationism; the constructive 
view is compatible with both local and distributed conceptions of traces. 
Hybrid causal theories, including epistemic-causal theories (Debus, 
2010) and autonoetic-causal theories (Dokic, 2014; Klein, 2015), depart 
to some extent from the causal tradition by maintaining that appropriate 
causation is necessary but not sufficient for remembering; they do not take 
an explicit stand with respect to transmissionism or preservationism, and 
the feasibility of the various views in this space remains to be explored. 
Postcausal theories, including the functionalist theory (Fernández, 
this volume) and the simulation theory (Michaelian, 2016c; cf. De 
Brigard, 2014a and Shanton & Goldman, 2010), make a decisive break 
with the causal tradition by maintaining that appropriate causation is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for remembering. The functionalist 
theory does not take an explicit stand for or against transmissionism or 
preservationism. The simulation theory explicitly rejects preservationism 
but like the constructive causal theory, might in principle be combined 
with either a local or a distributed conception of traces and hence might 
or might not reject transmissionism. Other theories: In principle, theories 
that maintain that appropriate causation is sufficient but not necessary 
for remembering might be described, but the motivation for such theories 
is unclear, and none have so far been proposed.
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remembering and relearning and between remembering and nonmemorial 
retention. 
 7 Conclusions 
 Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher, causal theories of various sorts—
neoclassical, hybrid, and distributed/procedural—continue to dominate the 
landscape in the philosophy of memory (see  Figure 1.1 ). Clearly, the fi eld as 
a whole has yet to move decisively beyond the causal theory. The emergence 
of postcausal theories, however, hints at increased awareness of the tension 
between the causal theory and the reconstructive character of remembering. 
Of course, while postcausal theories may be better suited than causal theories 
to accommodating the reconstructive character of remembering, they will 
themselves inevitably face objections. The functionalist theory is too new for 
objections to it to have emerged. But objections to the simulation theory—
focusing on the “continuist” view of past- and future-oriented mental 
time travel that it presupposes ( Perrin, 2016 ;  Michaelian, 2016a ;  Perrin & 
Michaelian, 2017 ) and on its ability to distinguish between remembering 
and misremembering or confabulating ( Robins, 2016b ;  Michaelian, 2016b ; 
 Robins, forthcoming )—have already begun to be voiced. Time will tell 
whether postcausal theorists are able to address these and other objections 
and convince signifi cant numbers of philosophers of memory to move 
beyond the causal theory. 
 Notes 
 1  Thanks for feedback to audiences at the Université Grenoble Alpes, the University 
of Otago, and Issues in Philosophy of Memory (Cologne, 2017), and thanks for 
written comments to Steven James and Denis Perrin. 
 2  For background on the empiricist theory, see Bernecker, 2008. Bernecker also 
discusses the epistemic theory, which has likewise been eclipsed in popularity 
by the causal theory; the epistemic theory is not to be confused with the hybrid 
causal-epistemic theory reviewed in Section 5. Martin and Deutscher were not the 
fi rst to state the causal theory, but they offer the canonical statement of the theory, 
and so we do not discuss earlier formulations here. 
 3  Throughout, “retrieved representation” refers to the representation entertained 
by the subject at the time of (apparent) remembering, regardless of whether the 
process responsible for the production of the representation in question in fact 
involved retrieval of information and regardless of whether remembering in 
general is understood as involving retrieval. 
 4  For an extended discussion of nonmemorial retention, see Robins, 2016b. 
 5  For a detailed argument to this effect, see Robins, 2016a. 
 6  Cf. Deutscher’s (2017) comparison of Bernecker’s to Martin and Deutscher’s 
theory, which provides a more detailed discussion of the points of similarity 
between the two. 
 7  Some have argued for a return to epistemic (e.g., Adams, 2011) or even empiricist 
theories (Byrne, 2010) of remembering, but such arguments are infrequent. 
 8  “Preservationism” sometimes refers to the view that memory preserves 
justifi cation, as opposed to the view that it preserves content (see Lackey, 2005; 
Fernández, 2016; Frise, forthcoming). We are concerned here neither with this 
form of preservationism nor with the corresponding form of generationism. 
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